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Abstract
The degree-of-presence (of the quantum system) concept, accompanying
that of the wavefunction-reality postulate, is introduced and studied in two
ways. To begin with, an incomplete exposition of the present author’s views
is given. Subsequently, a short historical and philosophical review of answers
to the question about the meaning of indeterminate individual-system prob-
abilities is presented from the literature. It is done in the form of a carefully
selected collage of quotations mostly with polemic comments by the present
author and with further elaboration of his point of view. The advocated no-
tion of ’degree of presence’ generalizes the intuitively most easily acceptable
idea of ’delocalization’ in (roughly called) wavelike behavior of a quantum
system.
Keywords: Wavefunction reality; Individual-system probability; Propensity
1. Introduction
The assumption of a realistic interpretation of the wavefunction has a
long standing. The origin of my personal interest for the subject lies in my
recent research. A successful run of quantum-mechanical insights in intricate
experiments assuming reality of the wavefunction of individual quantum sys-
tems has been performed by the present author (Herbut and Vujicˇic´, 1997;
Herbut 2008a; Herbut 2010a). Individual-system probability as an important
open question has remained lingering on.
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The last two mentioned studies of the present author deal with intricate
variations on the two-slit interference experiment. As it is well-known, one
has in its description a state vector (vector of norm one) |ψ〉 that consists
of two components expressed via state vectors |ψ〉i, i = u, l as follows
|ψ〉 = α |ψ〉u + β |ψ〉l, α, β ∈ C |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, α 6= 0 6= β. (1)
The components mean passing the upper slit u and the lower slit l
respectively, and they are orthogonal 〈ψ|u|ψ〉l = 0 due to disjoint respective
domains Du and Dl (around the slits) on which they are non-zero.
Further, the square moduli of the amplitudes |α|2 and |β|2 are the
probabilities that the particle can be found, in a so-called which-way mea-
surement, to come from Du or Dl respectively. One wonders how one
should understand these probabilities having in mind the individual-system
case.
One can find the following quotation on individual-system probabilities
in a book of Pauli (1994, p. 43):
Quote Pa: ”... incapable of further reduction ... a primary
fundamental notion of physics.”
Saunders (1998, p. 20) makes a similar remark:
Quote Sa: ”Probability cannot be reduced to anything else: that
is what I have been saying throughout.”
Butterfield (2002) speaks of individual-system probability as follows:
Quote Bu: ”[O]rthodoxy says: the probability distribution as-
cribed by the state is not for values possessed at some time or
other; but for values yielded as result (pointer-reading) on a mea-
surement apparatus. It is curious for the interpretation of state to
invoke something so extrinsic to the system; and furthermore, for
a typical measurement on a typical quantum system, something
so vast compared with the system, so variable from occasion to
occasion, and so vague. Indeed, it is surely more than curious: it
is unsatisfactory, unless you have some general operationalist or
instrumentalist view of theories.”
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Butterfield speaks only of the manner how we, gross human beings, can
take cognizance of the individual-system probabilities. The proposed ’degree
of presence’ concept is an attempt to grasp their true nature.
The term ’degree-of-reality’ appears in the article by Busch and Jaeger
(2010). Their idea differs from that of ’degree of presence’ (see subsection 3.7
below for details). Sudbery (2011) gives a comprehensive discussion relevant
for the individual-system probability concept (see subsection 3.8. below).
Since indeterminate properties can be viewed also as dispositions, the nice
review article of M. Sua´rez (2007) is also worthy of reading. It reviews Mar-
genau’s latencies, Heisenberg’s potentialities, Maxwell’s propensitons, and
the selective propensities of the author.
I feel that the question of the physical meaning of individual-system quan-
tum probabilities deserves additional study.
In section 2 I’ll introduce and explain the degree-of-presence concept.
Section 3 is devoted to a collage of relevant quotes from other authors on
indeterminate events or properties accompanied by a detailed comparison
with the views of the present author, which are further elaborated where
suitable.
In the collage of quotes, the first three authors (Aristotle, Reichenbach
and Heisenberg) are mainly precursors of the degree-of-presence notion. The
quoted views of the following five (Popper, Shimony, Mermin, Busch and
Jaeger, and Sudbery) are inspirative for comparison and further elaboration
of my standpoint.
2. The present author’s view of individual-system probabilities as
degrees of presence
As it is well known, quantum probabilities are measured on ensembles
of equally prepared systems in the well-known frequentist way. One cannot
doubt the reality of the ensembles, in particular, not the measurement results
obtained in them. But then it is hard to imagine how one can doubt the
reality of the states of their constituents - of the individual quantum systems
that make up the ensemble.
The present author bases his position on this argument, and he is partial
to the wavefunction-reality point of view. It is assumed throughout that the
wavefunction describes not only the corresponding ensemble, but also the
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state of the individual systems of which the ensemble consists.
2.1 Gleason and degree of presence
It is one of my interpretational postulates of the quantum formalism that
the wavefunction and everything that it implies and is observable has reality,
i. e., it exists ’out there’ whether we observe it or not. The basic and
most important implication of the wavefunction is probability: if E is an
event (or property or statement, mathematically a projector) and |Ψ〉 is a
wavefunction (actually, a state vector, but we won’t distinguish the abstract
and the popular concrete representation form of this entity), then 〈Ψ| E |Ψ〉
is the probability of E in |Ψ〉 . We know, thanks to Gleason (1957), that
also the converse is true, there is no other state, meaning the wider class of
mixed-or-pure states, i. e., of density operators, that would give the same
probabilities.
The way I understand this is that | Ψ 〉 consists of these numbers
as of a kind of its observable pieces when E is running over the entire
quantum logic P(H) (the set of all events - projectors - defined in the state
space - Hilbert space - H of the system). In this manner, in the view of
the present author, reality of |Ψ〉 logically implies that of 〈Ψ | E |Ψ〉 .
Since these are numbers from the doubly closed interval [0, 1] , they can be
called ’degrees of presence’ of the quantum system in the corresponding
elements of P(H) . Since the projectors can, according to their physical
meaning, be events or properties or quantum statements, one can also speak
of degrees of presence of the quantum system in these quantum entities.
Naturally, one may view ’degree of presence’ as a semantic variation of
’probability’. But making terms and endowing them with a physical meaning
in the context of other physically meaningful notions (cf my comparison with
Shimony’s thoughts in subsection 3.5) seems to the present author to be the
only way to learn to grasp quantum reality.
My understanding of ’degree of presence’ is shaped on the concrete ex-
ample of delocalization, where I find it easiest to imagine it. If standard
quantum mechanics tells me that a particle passes coherently both slits in
a two-slit interference experiment, and the probability of passing the upper
slit is non-zero but small ( 0 < |α|2 ≪ |β|2 in (1)), this does not mean,
in my physical picture of the situation, that the passage of the upper slit is
less real than that of the lower one; it means that the particle is in a lesser
amount present there. This picture stems, of course, from the classical wave
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passing two openings simultaneously. For the time being I cannot do with
fewer classical notions. (Incidentally, as to ’interference’, cf Herbut (1992),
and more can be read on ’coherence’ in Herbut (2005a).)
The present author proposes to extend the interpretation of delocalization,
i. e., of degrees of localization, to the spectrum of an arbitrary observable;
particularly, to an arbitrary event or property or proposition and call it ’de-
gree of presence’. More specifically, one may use the terminological variations
degree of occurrence of an event, or degree of possession of a property,
or degree of truth of a proposition respectively.
Perhaps it is not superfluous to stress again that, according to the advo-
cated point of view, a lesser degree of presence does not mean less reality.
Reality is all or none. It is none only if 〈Ψ | E |Ψ〉 = 0 . A lesser degree of
presence means that the system (the wavefunction of which we are concerned
with) is to a lesser degree present in the entity in question (like in the case
of delocalization).
A wavefunction is both reality and knowledge. A degree of presence
that is smaller than 1 is not a partial or incomplete subjective information
on a more complete quantum reality ’out there’, but instead, it is complete
information on an objective and complete form of a quantum reality.
One should note that here, like in relative-state Everett theory (Ecerett
1957 and Everett 1973), ’potential’ or ’latent’ is, by definition, banned from
the interpretation. All parts, all components of the wavefunction, are real or
actual (I use this term as a synonym for real), in general, but the system is
in different degrees present in them.
Incidentally, I should point out that I strongly disagree with the still
widespread view, originating with the main founder of quantum mechanics
Niels Bohr (Petersen 1963) that the quantum-mechanical formalism has no
other purpose than to provide us with numerical values for probabilities,
which can then be tested experimentally. (Some ’rebels’ against this preju-
dice call it ”Shut up and calculate”.) I believe that the quantum-mechanical
formalism should teach us to comprehend quantum phenomena with as
few prejudices from classical physics as possible. (Still, it might be considered
a good thing that Bohr stopped large-scale inquiry into quantum insights,
when he did it. It might have slowed down the rapid progress of the practical
side of quantum mechanics that we have had up till now.)
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2.2 Subsystems and reduced density operators
One must keep in mind the fact that the physical systems of nature always
come entangled. We know from the quantum formalism that this means that
states of subsystems are usually described by reduced density operators that
are more general than wavefunctions. The standard argument goes as follows:
〈Ψ |12 (A1 ⊗ I2) |Ψ〉12 = tr[(|Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12)(A1 ⊗ I2)] = tr(ρ1A1), (2a)
where
ρ1 ≡ tr2(|Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12) (2b)
(’tr2’ denoting the trace over subsystem 2 ) is the state (reduced density
operator) of subsystem 1 .
Hence, probabilities of subsystem observables (like of A1 ) are actually
predictions of the wavefunction of the larger system (of system 1+2 in the
notation of relation (2a)), and the concept of ’degree of presence’ refers nec-
essarily also to the reduced density operators, i. e., to improper mixtures
(D’Espagnat 1976).
It should be pointed out that the ’degree of presence’ concept does not
apply to proper mixtures, which are density operators just like the im-
proper ones, but physically they contain incomplete knowledge or ignorance.
It was stated also by Heisenberg that proper mixtures lack full objectivity
(cf subsection 3.3).
As a speculation, I think that one might use the term ’believed degree
of presence’ in the quantum Bayesian way (cf Caves et al. 2002) for the
individual-system probability implied by a proper mixture.
2.3 Entanglement and relative states
There is a widespread dellusion that when one deals with a wavefunction
|φ〉 of a given physical system, then one may think of a world-wavefunction
that factorizes tensorically
|φ〉 |Φ〉rest−of−the−world.
For this to be valid the system under consideration would not be allowed to
have interacted with any part of the rest of the world ever up till the present
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moment. This is so because entanglement is a kind of remnant of interaction,
and it remains preserved in some form (cf Hulpke et al. 2006 and Herbut
2005b). Tensor factorization, on the other hand, means lack of entanglement.
One should call to mind that a wavefunction |φ〉 , as a rule, describes a
system in a quantum experiment, and its state is obtained by preparation. As
a consequence, the wavefunction is a conditional state in the collapse inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics (cf my unpublished study Herbut (2010b)).
It is a relative state in the no-collapse approach (Herbut 2011). I make use
of the terms ”approach” and ”view” as of synonyms of ”ı”.
The advocated view of quantum mechanics was called ’relative reality
of unitarily evolving state’ (RRUES by acronym) in my recently published
study Herbut (2008a). I am partial to the no-collapse or relative-state inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics following Everett (1957 and 1973), which
rests on ’unitary quantum mechanics’, in which the Schro¨dinger equation - or
equivalently the unitary evolution operator - rules all dynamics and collapse
never happens. (More on ’unitary quantum mechanics’ in my comments on
some thoughts of Sudbery in subsection 3.8 .)
2.4 Standard ’actualization’ and occurrence
Maximal degree of presence has a special position in standard quan-
tum mechanics. It is interpreted as actualization, collapse, objectification
etc., or specifically as occurrence of an event, possession of a property, truth
of a quantum proposition. Let me present a first discussion of this notion as
I see it.
To be concrete, I’ll confine myself to events (projectors) E . If in a pure
or improper mixed quantum state (density operator) ρ an event satisfies
tr(ρE) = 1 (degree of presence equalling 1 ), then and only then one
says in standard (collapse-interpretation) quantum mechanics that the event
occurs in this state.
The basic role of the concept of ’degree of presence’, or rather of ’degree
of occurrence’ in the case of events at issue, is, in my opinion, to put all
positive values of individual-system probabilities on equal footing as far as
reality is concerned. Occurrence takes place in different degrees.
Quantum events come in pairs E,Ec , where Ec ≡ I − E ( I be-
ing the identity operator) is the opposite event (the ortho-complementary
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projector). For all positive but non-maximal degrees of occurrence one has
1 > tr(ρE) > 0 < tr(ρEc) < 1.
A kind of ’quantum observer’, if such existed, might take cognizance - via
quantum correlations - of such a pair of events simultaneously. But classical
physics knows only the extreme degrees of occurrence: an event occurs or
it does not (then the opposite event occurs).
Observation of occurrence by human experimenters is performed with
the help of classical apparatuses. Hence we, gross classical beings, must
have actualization in the standard meaning, i. e., with maximal degree of
presence.
But what is standard ’actualization’ actually, one wonders. Of the many
answers, let me just mention three: it is collapse of the wavefunction on the
classical apparatus according to Bohr (and the Copenhagen interpretation
Stapp(1972)); it is collapse in the consciousness of the sentient observer ac-
cording to von Neumann (1955, last chapter); and finally, it is being in one of
the branches or in one of the component universes of the multiverse according
to the Everettian approach (Everett 1957, Everett 1973, De Witt 2004).
I am attracted to the Everett approach that guides my present investiga-
tions. But I have doubts (see my discussion in subsection 3.8 and the second
concluding remark in section 4.).
3. Review and comparison
In this section a historical and philosophical selection of views on the
notion of indeterminate properties predicted by a wavefunction is presented
from the literature. The selection is, of course, incomplete and subjective.
The review is displayed in the form of a collage of quotations accompanied
by comments to find out, if possible, where the views of the reviewed author
differ from those of the present author.
Incidentally, there are five terms in the literature (that I know of) desig-
nating positive probability less than 1 in application to individual quantum
systems: ”indeterminacy”, ”indefiniteness”, ”potentiality”, ”propensity” and
”latency” .
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3.1 Aristotle
In a remarkable recent article Sudbery (2011 pp. 8,9) writes:
Quote Su1: ”Aristotle, in a famous passage (Aristotle 1980),
considered the proposition ”There will be a sea-battle tomorrow”.
He argued that this proposition is neither true nor false (other-
wise we are forced into fatalism). Thus he rejected the law of
excluded middle for future-tense statements, implying that they
obey a many-valued logic. Modern logicians (Prior 1967) have
considered the possibility of a third truth-value in addition to
”true” or ”false’, namely u for ”undetermined”, for future-tense
statements. But, interestingly, Aristotle admitted that the sea-
battle might be more or less likely to take place. This suggests
that the additional truth values needed for future-tense state-
ments are not limited to 1, but can be any real number between
0 and 1 and should be identified with the probability that the
statement will come true. Turning this round gives us an objec-
tive form of probability (italics by F.H.) which applies to future
events, or to propositions in the future tense;...”
Aristotle couldn’t, of course, imagine that one day some people would
think, in principle, about everything, including the battle he was concerned
with, in terms of a change of a wave function governed by the Schro¨dinger
equation. But nevertheless, his thoughts might be considered to be an early,
perhaps the earliest, precursors of the quantum-mechanical probabilities.
3.2 The three-valued logic of Reichenbach
Reichenbach (1965, paragraph 30), writing about how to characterize
statements on latent or potential events, says:
Quote Re: ”... This is achieved with the introduction of a third
truth value of indeterminacy. The meaning of the term ”inde-
terminate” must be carefully distinguished from the meaning of
the term ”unknown”. The latter term applies even to two-valued
statements, since the truth value of a statement of ordinary logic
can be unknown; we then know, however, that the statement is
either true or false. The principle of the tertium non datur, or
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of the excluded middle, expressed in this assertion, is one of the
pillars of traditional logic. If, on the other hand, we have a third
truth value of indeterminacy, the tertium non datur is no longer
a valid formula; there is a tertium, a middle value, represented
by the logical status indeterminate.”
Quantum mechanics does contain the ”truth value indeterminacy”, but,
actually, one has more: something like a degree of indeterminacy, the sub-
jective aspect of ’degree of presence’ if the wavefunction is concerned.
Three-valued logic and probability goes back to Aristotle (1980). Impor-
tant contributions are also in Lukasiewicz (1970), Reichenbach (1949), and
Sudbery (2011).
3.3 Heisenberg
Heisenberg (1958, p. 53) wrote:
Quote He1: ”The probability function combines objective and
subjective elements. It contains statements about possibilities
or better tendencies (”potentia” in Aristotelian philosophy), and
those statements are completely objective, they do not depend on
any observer; and it contains statements about our knowledge of
the system, which of course are subjective in so far as they may
be different for different observers. In ideal cases the subjective
element in the probability function may be practically negligible
as compared with the objective one. The physicists then speak
of a ”pure case.””
Predictions of wavefunctions are ’objective statements’ in Heisenberg’s
wording. I cannot disagree with that. ”Statements about our knowledge,
that may be different for different observers” are implied by proper mixtures.
They are much discussed lately (see Herbut 2004 and the references therein).
They are almost completely excluded in this study because the ’degree-of-
presence’ concept is not applicable to them.
The only point where Heisenberg apparently differs from the advocated
degree-of-presence interpretation of probabilities implied by a wavefunction
is that he seems to allow for a small subjectivity in the latter. This can
be understood in two ways. Firstly, what he means may be that the wave-
function describes precisely and completely a model state of a model system,
10
and this differs to some extent from the real state of the real system. The
choice of such models may be due to the need to lessen complexity and to
subjectivity.
Secondly, he might have been aware of the ubiquitous entanglement;
Schro¨dinger (1935b and 1936) has brought them into focus. If a wavefunction
is a conditional state (or a relative state, which is formally equivalent Herbut
(2011)), it may be (formally) obtained from a proper mixture of a larger sys-
tem containing ignorance. If any of these explanations is valid, Heisenberg’s
wording is acceptable to me.
Also Busch and Jaeger (2010, p. 20) point out that the notion of ’unsharp
reality’ began with Heisenberg (1959, p. 140), who claimed:
Quote He2: ”... a course of events in itself is not determined by
necessity but that the possibility or rather the ’tendency’ towards
a course of events possesses itself a kind of reality a certain in-
termediate level of reality midway between the massive reality of
matter and the mental reality of an idea or picture...” ( translated
from German by Busch and Jaeger).
Then the two authors add (Busch and Jaeger, ibid., p. 20). ”He (meaning
Heisenberg - F. H.) notes that this concept of possibility is given in quantum
theory in the form of probability.”
I have the impression that more than half a century ago Heisenberg,
one of the great pioneers of quantum mechanics, was struggling both with
the idea of ”kinds of reality” and with the relation between ”necessity” and
randomness. The two dilemmas are absent from my RRUES approach (cf
the third passage in 2.3). There is one kind of reality, the quantum reality
given by the wavefunction, but, when particular events (or properties etc.)
are concerned, it appears in different degrees of presence of the system, and
they are observable in ensembles in the frequentist way. Necessity, i. e.,
determinism is universally valid in the multiverse. Randomness applies to
the branches or particular worlds (more details in subsection 3.8).
I cannot help disagreeing with Heisenberg’s words ”a course of events in
itself is not determined by necessity but that the possibility or rather the
’tendency’ towards (italics by F. H.) ...”. The degree-of-presence notion has
no dynamical side to it. In this respect Heisenberg is a precursor of Popper
and his propensity (cf subsection 3.4.), not of the dynamically completely
void ’degree-of-presence’ concept.
Further Busch and Jaeger go on:
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Quote (B+J)1: ”Heisenberg thus goes beyond the usual inter-
pretation of the pure quantum state |ψ〉 as the catalogue of all
actual properties - those with probability equal to one - of an in-
dividual system in that he considers |ψ〉 as the catalogue of the
potentialities of all possible (sharp) properties Q of the system,
quantified by the probabilities psi(Q) = 〈ψ | Q |ψ〉 ”.
In the terminology of Busch and Jaeger, ’sharp properties’ are those rep-
resented by projectors, whereas the ones for which positive operators that
are not projectors stand are ’unsharp properties’. The latter, if implied by a
wavefunction, are always non-maximal degrees of presence.
I understand the words of Busch and Jaeger so that Heisenberg may have
been the first author, or at least the first important author, who highlighted
indeterminate properties of individual quantum systems.
3.4 Popper’s propensity
Popper (1982, p. 159) wrote:
Quote Po1: ”According to this picture...all properties of the
physical world are dispositional, and the real state of a physical
system, at any moment, may be conceived as the sum total of
its dispositions - or its potentialities, or possibilities, or propen-
sities.”
These words sound as a precursor of Gleason’s theorem (cf 2.1). Selleri
and van der Merwe (1991, p. 1385), in the conclusion of their nice essay
on Popper, write:
Quote S+vdM: ”His proposal concerning propensities looks like
an unescapable fundamental ingredient for any future realistic
physics.”
Popper’s propensity is tendency for ’actualization’, and the latter is ’oc-
currence’ in the classical sense. Two more quotations make clear his position.
On p. 351 (Popper 1983) he says:
Quote Po2: ”[T]here is an analogy between the idea of propen-
sities and that of forces - especially fields of forces. . . . both
ideas draw attention to unobservable dispositional properties of
the physical world.”
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Further, on p. 395 ibid. he states:
Quote Po3: ”I propose to interpret the objective probability
of a single event as a measure of an objective propensity - of
the strength of the tendency, inherent in the specified physical
situation , to realize the event - to make it happen.”
Thus, Popper’s ’propensity’ is the tendency for standard actualization,
and even with some dynamical attributes. This is the reason why I can-
not accept it (and I cannot agree with Selleri and van der Merwe). I have
begun to explain my view of actualization in subsection 2.4, and I’ll give fur-
ther elaboration in my comments on some ideas of Shimony in subsection 3.5.
Thinking along lines that Popper initiated has moved on (Sua´rez 2004
and others) apparently with more mathematical and philosophical sophisti-
cation. But, it seems to the present author, that the reality-of-wavefunction
point of view requires a simpler idea for the indisputably primitive concept
of individual-system probability.
3.5 Shimony
Shimony (1993, second passage p. 179), in the context of Einstein’s
world-view, discusses indefinite quantum properties as follows.
Quote Sh1: ”The first of Einstein’s theses ...., and the one which
appears to stand highest in his philosophical hierarchy, is that
physical things ”claim a ’real existence’ independent of the per-
ceiving subject.” This thesis is consistent with all the conclusions
which we drew from an analysis of Bell’s theorem, the relevant
experiments, and the formalism of quantum mechanics. However,
this thesis of physical realism, when separated from the rest of
Einstein’s theses, leaves open the character of the real existence
of physical things. The foregoing analysis led to radical conclu-
sions regarding the character of physical existence: i. e., that
there are objective indefiniteness, objective chance, and objective
probability (italics by F.H.), in short, that there is a modality of
existence which has been designated as potentiality. ...”
One can find additional elucidation of his ideas in the following text (ibid.,
p. 142, 2nd passage):
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Quote Sh2: ”The combination of indefiniteness of value with
definite probabilities of possible outcomes can be completely re-
ferred to as potentiality, a term initially suggested by Heisenberg
(1958, p. 185). When a physical variable which initially is only
potential acquires a definite value, it can be said to be actu-
alized. So far, the only processes we have mentioned in which
potentialities are actualized are measurements, but in a non-
anthropocentric view of physical theory the measurement process
is only a special case of the interaction of systems, of special in-
terest to scientists because knowledge is thereby obtained, but
not fundamental from the standpoint of physical reality itself....”
Shimony’s clear and illuminating text highlights the concept of ’actu-
alization’ in an inspirative, but standard way. He mentions measurement,
but does not (at least not in the above excerpts) really point to the great
problem connected with measurement. Namely, ”in a non-anthropocentric
view of physical theory the measurement process is only a special case of
the interaction of systems” - he says. But in a collapse interpretation of
quantum mechanics this is not so because ’collapse’ is not a ’special case’ of
dynamical evolution (cf von Neumann 1955, p. 351). This is known as the
’measurement paradox’.
It is a problem only in collapse ıs. In a no-collapse (relative-state) ap-
proach measurement does not constitute a problem. There well defined mea-
surement interaction Busch et al. (1996) leads to a so-called premeasurement
state of object plus measuring instrument, in which the measurement results
have been copied to the measuring instrument state. There is no problem
except that the theory leads to the parallel worlds about which I’ll say more
in my comments on some ideas of Sudbery (cf subsection 3.8).
Another follower of Einstein, Bell found the Everettian no-callapse ap-
proach ”extravagant” (on account of the parallel universes, no doubt). There-
fore, he tried to comprehend ’measurement’ within collapse quantum me-
chanics. He wrote an article (Bell 1990) under the provocative title ”Against
Measurement”. This led to a beautiful controversy.
Reaction came from Peierls (1991) and from Gottfried (1991). The latter’s
article had the title ”Does Quantum Mechanics Carry the Seeds of Its Own
Destruction?”. (My answer would be: Not quantum mechanics, but perhaps
its collapse interpretation.) Gottfried’s reaction was criticized by Whitaker
(2008). Also Mermin (2006) reacted to Bell’s criticism of measurement. His
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argument, in its turn, was critically examined by Ghirardi (2008).
The difficulties with the ’measurement’ concept in collapse quantum me-
chanics are a strong indication that one should take the Everettian approach
into serious consideration. But one might retort that one thus barters one
burden for another, perhaps ending up with a more serious one. One must
find out which ’burden’ is the lighter one, which can be disposed of. The
measurement problem is with us for almost a century.
Measurement is performing the ’actualization’ that Shimony is concerned
with. I’ll present now a short exposition of how I see the connection be-
tween the three key concepts, entanglement, degree of presence,
and actualization.
Let | Ψ〉12 be an arbitrary state vector of a composite system (a so-
called bipartite state). It always has a bi-orthogonal expansion with real
coefficients (so-called canonical Schmidt expansion, cf subsections 2.1 - 2.3
in Herbut (2007) for a review)
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
i
ri | i〉1 | i〉2, ∀i, i
′ : 〈i |1| i
′〉1 = 〈i |2| i
′〉2 = δi,i′ . (3)
The sum is finite or infinite; the number of terms is called the Schmidt rank.
It is uniquely determined by the bipartite state, and so are the expansion
coefficients {ri : ∀i} , though the basis {|i〉1 : ∀i} in expansion (3) is not.
A good quantitative measure of the amount of entanglement in | Ψ〉12 is
the so-called mutual information (cf Herbut 2005c) I ≡ −
∑
i rilnri .
Let the Schmidt rank, say N , be, for simplicity, finite 1 < N < ∞ .
Then the maximal value of the mutual information is Imax = lnN , and
ri = 1/N, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Thus, for large N , we obtain a large amount
of entanglement if the degrees of presence of the events |i〉1〈i|1 in |Ψ〉12 ,
ri , are very small. Conversely, if some of the degrees of presence ri are
large, the mutual information is small. In the opposite extreme case, when
there is no entanglement (N=1), the degree of presence is 1 .
In this sense the amount of entanglement and the degree of presence of
suitable subsystem events, ’correlations’ and ’correlata’ (see the next subsec-
tion), are kind of complementary to each other.
The opposite-subsystem events | i〉1〈i |1 and | i〉2〈i |2 in relation (3)
not only have the same degree of presence ri , but they are also the relative
states with respect to each other (conditional states of each other in collapse
ı). One can say that they carry information about each other.
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Viewing things in the way I have just suggested, there is nothing special
about ’actualization’, when N = 1 . Loosely speaking, quantum systems
can ’know about one another’ for any non-zero degree of presence. We need
’actualization’ in the standard sense because we are incarcerated in a classical
world, where the degrees of presence of events are confined to zero and one.
If we want to understand the quantum world, we must consider all possible
quantum values of the degrees of presence on the same footing. In other
words, we should understand ’actualization’ as a synonym of ’reality’. It is
then valid for all positive degrees of presence.
3.6 Mermin
Mermin (1998) writes (in section III with the title ”The puzzle of ob-
jective probability”):
Quote Me1: ”[T]he fundamental role probability plays in quan-
tum mechanics has nothing to do with ignorance (unlike in clas-
sical physics - remark by the present author). The correlata -
those properties we would be ignorant of - have no physical re-
ality. There is nothing for us to be ignorant of.... We lack an
adequate understanding of how probability or correlation is to be
understood ... throughout this essay I shall treat correlation and
probability as primitive concepts...”
”The correlations not the correlata” has become a well-known mantra
of Mermin’s ”Ithaca interpretation” program, which I consider to be very
promising and, above all, inspiring. A multipartite wavefunction usually
contains entanglement, the most quantum kind of correlation; it is real and
it represents a significant part of the reality of the wavefunction.
To illustrate the important notion of correlata, let me upgrade the above
two-slit experiment (cf the Introduction) into the one in the real experiment
of Kim et al. (2000), where instead of slits one has two excited atoms that
emit in superposition, i. e., coherently, by cascade de-excitation a pair of
photons (in opposite directions):
|Ψ〉12 = (1/2)
1/2
(
|ψ〉u1 |ψ〉
u
2 + |ψ〉
l
1 |ψ〉
l
2
)
, (4)
where i = 1, 2 label the two photons, and j = u, l refer to the two atoms
that have emitted the two photons (counterparts of the upper and the lower
slit).
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The subsystem events (projectors) | ψ〉u1〈ψ |
u
1 and | ψ〉
u
2〈ψ |
u
2 of the
opposite photons, cascade partners meaning emission from the ’upper’ atom,
are correlated in |Ψ〉12 : if photon 1 is emitted from the atom u , then
so is photon 2 due to the cascade de-excitation. They, and symmetrically
when one replaces u by l , are the correlata. Mermin is right claiming
that they ”have no physical reality” if, in keeping with the standard view,
one restricts oneself to maximal degree of presence or, speaking in the con-
crete terms of events, when one defines as occurrence only probability-one
occurrence as in classical physics and in the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics (see Stapp 1972).
In the approach supported by the present author one takes into account
all possible degrees of presence from zero to one (in particular, all degrees of
occurrence in the open interval (0, 1) ). Therefore, in the view of the present
author, the above correlata do have reality, but their degree of presence, i.
e., the degree of the systems presence in the correlata is less than 1 ; in
particular, it is 1/2 .
Let me repeat that, to my mind, a lesser degree of presence does not mean
less reality. Reality is all or none. A lesser degree means that the quantum
system is ’there’ in a smaller amount (like in delocalization).
Thus, Mermin and myself seem to share the belief in reality of the individual-
system probabilities; though he, unlike myself, may not extend this to all
probabilities. But we certainly differ in our views on the correlata. Mermin’s
words ”There is nothing for us to be ignorant of” are not valid in this ap-
proach.
Perhaps Mermin’s and my views on reality differ more than one would
suspect at first sight. Mermin determines the concept of correlations in terms
of mean values of all observables (Hermitian operators) of the subsystems
that are correlated (Mermin 1998, p. 754)) including, of course, projectors.
He attributes reality to the correlations, and reality of the probabilities seems
to be a consequence as far as they partake in correlations. Then, probabilities
implied by improper mixtures might not be real for Mermin, though they are
real for me (cf subsection 2.2).
In a preliminary study (Herbut 2008b, not published yet) it was shown
that, following Mermin, one can restrict the observables used by Mermin to
events, and ipso facto determine the correlations in terms of probabilities
only. (One can essentially further restrict even the set of events utilized.) In
this manner, one can derive the reality of correlations from that of
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probabilities.
Let me put this clearly: In my view, on ground of Gleason’s theorem,
the individual-system probabilities derive their reality directly from that
stipulated for the wavefunction (cf 2.1). Correlations derive theirs from that
of the probabilities, and so do the correlata if their probability is positive.
But, of course, I may have misunderstood Mermin. If he believes in the
reality of the wave function, then it seems unlikely that he can doubt the
reality of any observable part of it.
Perhaps surprisingly, Mermin and myself seem to agree up to a point in
utilizing the no-collapse relative-state approach to understand actualization.
He says (on p. 755) of Mermin (1998):
Quote Me2 ”To the extent that ”I” am describable by physics,
which deals only with the correlations between me and the pho-
tomultipliers (phm), physics can only (correctly) assert that pho-
tomultiplier phm-n firing is perfectly correlated with my knowing
that photomultiplier phm-n fired for either value of n . The
question that physics does not answer is how it can be that I
know that it is phm-1 and is not phm-2. This is indeed a prob-
lem. It is part of the problem of consciousness.”
Mermin’s formulation ”to the extent that ”I” am describable by physics”
shows reservation towards the no-collapse approach. I do not share this
reservation. But still he allows the approach, and I agree with him about
the perfect correlations. Instead of ”I” in his text, one could have a clas-
sical measuring apparatus. Then, ”to the extent that” quantum mechanics
is extended to classical systems, in particular detectors, one has the famous
paradox of measurement in quantum mechanics. If, on the other hand, Mer-
min’s ”I” is replaced by ”my friend”, then we have the known paradox of
Wigner ’s friend (Wigner 1961).
An Everettian no-collapse approach, the point of view that is taken by me,
treats all these cases on the same footing (see subsection 3.8). This approach
is called the ’relative-state’ one precisely because every wavefunction is taken
in relation to a well-defined subsystem and pure state of it (in Everett’s
original expositions) or any event on the subsystem (in my straightforward
elaboration of Everett, Herbut 2011). This subsystem plus an event on it
is a subject entity. It is a premise, in my view, of Mermin’s text (or of an
analogous text with the measuring apparatus or with Wigner’s friend).
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When Mermin is aware of seeing phm-1 and not any other value of n ,
one has a different subject entity: Mermin plus the event ’he is aware of phm-
1’. In the relative-state approach this is not a ”problem of consciousness”
(or a problem of a classical measuring apparatus, or of Wigner’s friend). It
is just a consistent use of the quantum-mechanical formalism. (It need not
be put aside as in Mermin’s presentation.)
What has been said should, of course, be distinguished from the problems
like ’what is conscousness’, ’what are classical systems’, ’what is Wigner’s
friend when Wigner has not asked him yet what result he sees’. For me all
”photomultiplier phm-n firings” are realities, but relative to different subject
entities. This is why I call my understanding of the no-collapse relative-state
approach ’relative reality of unitarily evolving states (RRUES)’ (cf 2.3) as in
my previous study Herbut (2008a).
3.7 Busch and Jaeger
Busch and Jaeger (2010 subsection 2.4 there) write:
Quote (B+J)2: ”We noted above that what is actual has the
power to act. Similarly, when a property is absent there is no
power to act. If this idea is extended to apply to the intermediate
mode of existence, potentiality, one may say that an indetermi-
nate property has a quantifiable, limited degree of reality (italics
by F. H.) that manifests itself in a limited capacity potentiality
to induce the associated measurement outcome. A quantitative
measure of the degree of reality and associated potentiality is
given by the quantum mechanical probability, which provides the
likelihood for an individual outcome to occur in the event of mea-
surement.”
The authors of this excerpt use the term ”degree of reality”. For them
the indefinite properties of individual-system wavefunctions are not on the
same footing as the definite properties (maximal degree of presence). It is
claimed that the former have limited reality, i. e., less than full reality, if
I understand it correctly. Besides, I cannot agree with the dynamical ideas
ascribed to indefinite properties like ”power to act” or lack of it.
They write ”limited capacity potentiality to induce the associated mea-
surement outcome”. From my point of view they fail to make a distinction
between more inherent attributes of the state of the individual system, such
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as the degrees of presence in case of a wavefunction, and the more external
ones that come to the fore when we observe them (in the frequentist way,
cf the first concluding remark in section 4.). But even the latter are, in my
opinion, without any ”power to act”. It appears that Busch and Jaeger are
under the influence of Popper’s propensity, which I have criticized above.
Actualization comes about in measurement, when the quantum world
meets the classical one, and degrees of presence become converted, via en-
sembles, into frequencies. Raising actualization to an exalted position in
comparison with the degrees of presence that are less that 1 when con-
sidering more inherent properties of the state of the individual system may
result in a failure to grasp quantum essentials.
Another interesting passage from the article of Busch and Jaeger (ibid.
on p. 2) reads:
Quote (B+J)3: ”On a realist interpretation of Quantum Me-
chanics as a complete theory, the referent of quantum mechanical
propositions is the individual system. This would not only recog-
nize the possibility that such a philosophically realist interpreta-
tion could in the end enable the best description of the physical
world; it also has the potential benefit of providing us with guid-
ance in developing new, appropriately adapted intuitions about
microphysical objects.”
This is a good answer to the possible objection to the advocated ap-
proach claiming that degree-of-presence is just another term for probability.
It is more than that. It means putting a concept, individual-system proba-
bility, in its proper place, in its proper conceptual context. This may pave
the way for a deeper understanding.
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3.8 Sudbery
Now I present Sudbery’s version of, what is called, the many-worlds or
the multiverse view of universally valid quantum mechanics. Subsequently,
I’ll give my comments that will make clear to what extent I do agree with
him.
On page 4 Sudbery (2011) one can read:
Quote Su2: ”External truth: The truth about the universe is
given by a state vector |Ψ〉U in a Hilbert space HU evolving
according to the Schro¨dinger equation. If the Hilbert space can
be factorised as HU = HS ⊗ HE , where HS contains states
of an experiencing observer, then
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|ηn〉 |Φn(t)〉, (5)
and all the states | ηn 〉 for which | Φn(t) 〉 6= 0 describe
experiences which actually occur at time t. Internal truth from
the perspective | ηn 〉 : I actually have experience ηn which
tells me that the rest of the universe is in the state | Φn(t)〉 .
This is an objective fact; everybody I have talked to agrees with
me.”
Essentially, we are back at the problem of Mermin (cf quote ”Me2”), of
Wigner’s friend, of the measurement paradox etc.
To begin with, I would prefer to include in | ηn〉 (one possible version
of) the entire classical world with all possible active or passive observers in
it. Sudbery’s insistence on subjective ”experience” might go under the name
’many-minds’ instead of ’many worlds’ as done occasionally. I do not think
that there is any important difference.
Sudbery does not mention decoherence, which has been introduced im-
plicitly by Zeh (1970) as the dynamical source for the expansion (5) (cf also
Joos et al. (2003), especially Zeh’s article there). Further, the terms in (5)
are then considered as the parallel worlds.
The lhs of (5), representing the ”external truth”, is the state of the mul-
tiverse. It changes in a deterministic fashion according to the Schro¨dinger
equation, and, I agree with Sudbery, that it is devoid of probabilities. But it
is devoid of other attributes as well (see my ’doubt’ below). The probabilities
appear in the ”internal truth”.
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What I find disturbing is the fact that my own person (as well as yours,
dear reader) is included in |ηn〉 , and, in Sudbery’s internal view, this is the
case for just one value of n . But in Sudbery’s external view there are many
values (actually infinitely many) of n all include me and all living creatures.
This makes us a component not a subsystem (like the infamous cat of
Schro¨dinger (1935a), which appears as a live and a dead component). The
subsystem is given by HS and it comprises all the components.
If this is all true, an ancestor of mine, when technology advances suf-
ficiently, may, like in television stories, ’meet’ or rather become one, with
another component of himself.
Disturbing or not, if one assumes universal validity of the quantum for-
malism, it leads to decomposition (5).
I am personally prepared to go along with the expounded Everettian
universally-valid quantum-mechanical vision of the multiverse all the way up
to relation (5). But here I have a serious doubt.
Aware of a post-Everett standpoint of Wheeler (1977, p. 2), the very
mentor and promoter of Everett’s theory in the beginning (cf Byrne 2010
and Wheeler 1957), who, in turn, followed Wigner (1973, pp. 382-383), I
share their opinion that the lhs of (5) has no physical meaning.
The wave functions {| Φn(t)〉 : ∀n} (cf (5)) from Sudbery’s internal
view are, in my opinion, legitimate extrapolations from our quantum exper-
iments in the physical laboratory, but the lhs of (5), i. e., the wavefunc-
tion | Ψ(t)〉U of the multiverse (’universe’ in Sudbery’s terminology), is
not. There is no external observer because U is by definition everything.
Then observables, and measurement, and all the concepts of which quan-
tum mechanics consists are not valid for this wavefunction. One obtains it
as a ”view from nowhere” (as Sudbery mentions). I think that no-collapse-
oriented foundationally-minded physicists and philosophers are still wrestling
with the idea of parallel universes (cf Saunders et al. 2010 and Carr 2007).
One might consider | Ψ〉U , the lhs of in (5), as deprived of physical
meaning, but still as a valid mathematical ’envelope concept’ or ’umbrella
notion’ to encompass all possible proper subsystem states, which have full
physical meaning.
For the reason of analogy, let me take resort to special relativity theory.
The Minkowski space has itself no immediate physical meaning, but every
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one of its elements, points, is a possible event with full physical meaning.
The space is just a mathematical ’envelope concept’ enabling us to view all
relevant possibilities.
Incidentally, in the Everettian expansion (5) |Φn(t)〉 is a relative state
taken relative to the subject state |ηn〉 . In the language of textbook quan-
tum mechanics the former would be called a conditional state, that would
come about if the condition, the event |ηn〉〈ηn | , occurred giving rise to the
collapse of the lhs of (5) into one of the terms |ηn〉 |Φn(t)〉 on the rhs.
Another important passage in Sudbery’s article argues against a Bayesian
(purely subjectivistic, Caves et al. 2002) interpretation of probability. It
reads as follows ( ibid. p. 8).
Quote Su3: ”... our experience in a quantum-mechanical world
seems to require a description in terms of objective chance. Things
happen randomly, but with definite probabilities that cannot be
reduced to our beliefs. The value of the half-life of uranium 238
is a fact about the world, not a mere consequence of someones
belief.”
The present author agrees with Sudbery completely concerning purely
subjective individual-system quantum probabilities.
3.9. Einstein’s boxes and delocalization
Let me first mention the famous Einstein boxes (Norsen 2005; sometimes
called De Broglie boxes). A wavefunction |ψ〉p describes a single particle
homogeneously delocalized within a box. The box is then partitioned into
two; one of the boxes thus obtained is brought to London and the other is
taken to Tokyo. When two observers, one in London and one in Tokyo, open
the boxes, only one of them will find the (whole) particle.
Nevertheless, quantum mechanics tells us that, before opening, the par-
ticle was not in one of the boxes. The wavefunction describing the particle
delocalized in the two boxes implies coherence between its two one-box com-
ponents, i. e., these are capable of interference. It would be impossible if
the particle were in one of the boxes. (Then the particle would be described
by a proper mixture.) Unfortunately, the London-and-Tokyo observers are
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unable to perform an interference experiment. But in the physically isomor-
phic case of a two-slit experiment (cf relation (1)) this can be done (at least
in an ensemble).
We easily picture the mentioned opening of the boxes in the collapse
ı. To describe it in the no-collapse, relative-state approach, let us assume,
for simplicity, that the observers in London and Tokyo are also in a pure
state |φ〉LTo . Then, before opening the boxes we have the composite state
| φ〉LTo | ψ〉
LT
p , where | ψ〉
LT
p is the state of the particle delocalized in the
London and the Tokyo boxes.
The act of opening the boxes is, in principle, a dynamical evolution that
converts the last mentioned composite state into
(1/2)1/2
(
|φ〉Lo |ψ〉
L
p+ |φ〉
T
o |ψ〉
T
p
)
, (6)
where the terms correspond to finding the particle in the London or the
Tokyo box respectively. Note that the coherence is not destroyed; it is only
elevated to the composite system. The particle is now in the proper mixture
(1/2)
(
|ψ〉Lp 〈ψ |
L
p + |ψ〉
T
p 〈ψ |
T
p
)
. Needless to say that ’finding the particle
in the London box’, e. g., is the relative state relative to the subject state
|φ〉Lo in the composite state (6).
If we choose to view the state after opening the boxes via the all-encompassing
decomposition (5) that we have borrowed from Sudbery, then we must join
the state | χ〉r of the rest of the world in case of opening. But we must
also allow for the possibility of not opening the boxes, because a decision on
part of the observers can be made or not (in a parallel world it is not made),
just like it is in the case of measurement results. Besides, there may be also
other world components.
Thus, instead of (6) we obtain
α
(
|φ〉Lo |ψ〉
L
p+ |φ〉
T
o |ψ〉
T
p )
)
|χ〉r + β
(
|φ〉LTo |ψ〉
LT
p |χ〉
′
r
)
+ . . . , (7)
where | φ〉Lo and | φ〉
T
o are now the states of Sudbery’s ”experiencing”
observers who find the particle in the London or the Tokyo box respectively,
and the product of the other two wavefunctions applies to Sudbery’s ’rest of
the world’.
It is assumed that ’the rest of the world’ is not the same when the boxes
are opened and when they are not. This makes the composite state (6) the
relative state with respect to the subject state |χ〉r in the larger composite
state (7), etc. (This state has to be orthogonal to all the other states of the
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rest of the world in (7).)
4. Concluding remarks
One might say roughly that viewing the individual-system probabilities
as degrees of presence is, following the German philosopher Immanuel Kant,
Ding an Sich (thing for itself), and that measuring the probabilities in en-
sembles in the frequentist way, when we take cognisance of the their values,
is Ding fu¨r Uns (thing for us). Strictly speaking, only the very existence
of a quantum system under consideration, its reality, is ’a thing for itself’.
Our quantum knowledge |Φn(t)〉 (cf relation (5)) about it, though it is a
maximal quantum reality, it is relative reality, taken with respect to the state
| ηn〉 of our mind, or of the measuring instrument etc. Even if we do not
take (5) to be a physically meaningful decomposition of the wavefunction of
everything, the lhs can be the wavefunction of another subject entity, e. g.,
of ’Wigner’ when he considers his ’friend’. ’Relative reality’ itself is a step
towards the subject entity, and towards the ’thing for us’. The frequentist
measurement is only the last step.
At the time of writing this article I have a fundamental dilemma. Namely,
I believe that Occam’s razor is a good principle for science. Applying it to
the Everettian approach, we have a minimum of assumptions at the input,
but a maximum of hardly acceptable final outcomes (the parallel worlds) at
the output. One wonders if one should not, perhaps, apply Occam’s razor
partly also to the output.
If I am allowed to speculate, it seeems to me that this can be done by pos-
tulating that each system has an ’individuality beyond quantum mechanics’
(not a quantum property). Then it won’t branch into the different worlds
and the system will remain a subsystem of the universe, not a component.
One way to achieve this might be to take suitable hidden variables. The
most elaborate theory along these lines utilizes the Bohmian (nonquantum)
positions of all particles (Bohm and Hiley 1993). (No two particles can be
at the same place. Hence, their non-quantum position is their ’individuality
beyond quantum mechanics’.)
Relation (5) is still valid, perhaps with only mathematical meaning. No
more than one term (one branch) is real in the classical sense; the one into
which the ’individuality beyond quantum mechanics’, together with those
of the rest of the classical world, ’falls’ in a random way. The other terms
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are, at the instant at issue, ’unrealized former possibilities’. But they still
represent quantum reality, and they may partake in forming a future state.
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